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This article focuses on analysing the role of financial wealth in the generation of 
income and how it is reflected in the income distribution between households. Piketty 
believes that we are living in an era of exceptionally narrow income distribution and 
that due to the increase of financial as well as inherited property; we are entering an 
era of increasing income distribution. In this article, the same phenomenon is 
scrutinised but with a conceptually consistent framework in which the national 
balance sheets are combined with the related income flows. After this, the income 
flows which are missing from the national income concepts are added. Finally, the 
household sector income flows are separated and are linked with income distribution 
data, and these income flows are broken down by income deciles.  
The outcome of this analysis is that even though financial wealth in relation to the 
common wage development has almost doubled, the rates of return have almost 
halved. Additionally, as the part of the property income flows are received by other 
economic sectors than the households, the distribution of primary income, i.e. income 
before redistribution, of different income deciles has not changed significantly in the 
past twenty years.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Over the last decade, there has been much discussion over what role wealth plays in 
the generation of income. Thomas Piketty [1] argues that the growth of wealth plays a 
central role in the distribution of income. After WWII, Europe went through an era of 
exceptionally equally distributed income. This is the outcome of active income 
redistribution policies as well as the destruction of wealth during the two World Wars. 
The World Wars were followed by an exceptionally long era of social democratic 
governments whose policies were aimed at equal income distribution. However, 
Piketty thinks that this is only a temporary period and we are returning to the La Belle 
Époque1, when rich family dynasties played a central role in political decision-making 
and overall in the economy. His argument is that wealth accumulates increasingly in 
wealthy households and this wealth is playing an increasingly important role in the 
generation of income, which will lead to increasing income distribution. 
 
Over the past decades, wealth has indeed increased rapidly. Piketty argues that the 
role of inherited wealth will further increase, and the property income generated by 
wealth will play an increasingly important role in the generation of income. His main 
argument is that if returns on capital (r) are greater than economic growth (g), the 
income distribution increases. The idea behind this is as follows: in the case of 
functional income distribution, i.e. the relation between compensation of employees 
and profits (operational surplus), if the compensation of employees increases more 
slowly than profits, the profit share of national income increases. As wealth, and thus 
property income, typically concentrates in a few households, such growth leads to 
increasingly unequal income distribution. Piketty assumes that the economic growth 
(g) in the long run defines the increase of compensation of employees and that the 
property income would mostly depend on the returns on capital (r). 
 
Since the beginning of the financial crisis (2008-09), there has been increasing 
interest in different types of distributional national accounts. Typically, these are 
either national accounts aggregates or the aggregates of household sector in which 
distributional measures are included. The financial crisis increased interest in income 
distribution. Additionally, the report by Joseph Stiglitz, Amartya Sen and Jean-Paul 
Fitoussi [2], which was published in the middle of the acute financial crisis, 
emphasised that the quantitative measurement of economy and welfare should focus 
on actual households rather than on macroeconomic aggregates.2 This type of account 
allows an analysis of economic growth and income distribution between households 
within the same framework. Additionally, Stiglitz et. al. [2] suggested including 
distributional information in the national accounts household sector. This was also 
suggested in the report published in 2009 by the Financial Stability Board and 
                                                 
1 This refers to the era before WWI. This concept came into existence after WWI and refers in a 
romantic manner to the politically optimistic, peaceful and wealthy era. The era starts from the end of 
the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71) and ends with WWI.   
2 Peter van de Ven [3] has emphasised that the increasing interest in wealth depended on three factors: 
(1) increase of wealth – in particular increase of financial wealth; (2) in the societies as well as in 
political debate, an overall increase of interest in income and wealth distribution; and (3) the U.S. 
subprime crisis, which was trigged by the subprime loans that were granted to the low income 
households. 
International Monetary Fund on the Financial Crisis and Information Gaps [4], which 
responded to a request from the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors 
to explore information gaps. 
 
At the European level, these accounts with distributional information have been 
developed in two contexts. First, the European Commission (Eurostat) and OECD 
Expert Group on Disparities in National Accounts have focused on developing 
distributional income accounts. Second, in the context of the European System of 
Central Banks there is an expert group that is focused on investigating the linkage 
between Household Finance and Consumption Survey and Financial Accounts 
balance sheets.[5] Moreover, Thomas Piketty, after his famous book Capital in the 
Twenty-First Century [1], has together with Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman 
broken down the national income of different countries by income quintiles.3 Branko 
Milanovic [7] has pointed out that the relation between functional income and income 
distribution between households is more complicated than Piketty presents in his 
studies. Piketty assumes that the households receive income in the end even though 
the income would have been generated and consumed, for instance, in the government 
sector. It can be assumed that in the end there is always an individual who benefits 
from the income. Even though this idea sounds plausible, it is not correct.4 This does 
not, however, overturn Piketty’s argument that wealth and property income play an 
increasingly important role in economies. 
 
This article analyses the relation between wealth, distribution of national income 
(functional income distribution) and income distribution between households in a 
single model. The model starts by linking the financial accounts balance sheets 
(covering all the financial instruments) with the corresponding income flows of the 
national accounts. This allows the calculation of instrument-specific rates of return, 
which corresponds with Piketty’s return on capital (r).  Piketty uses national 
accounts’ income concept in defining r, i.e. it includes profits, dividends, interest, 
rents and other income from capital. The other income in capital is, in practice, the 
part of operational surplus that is not distributed as dividends and is reinvested in 
production. This implies that neither realised nor unrealised holding gains are 
considered income. The same concept is applied in this article.5 After this income 
flows are completed with the missing flows/components of the national income. The 
national income in the model corresponds with Piketty’s economic growth (g). After 
this, the household sector is separated from the national income (primary income). 
Finally, the primary income components of the household sector are linked with the 
income components of the income distribution survey. This allows analysis of the 
primary income distribution (functional income distribution) by income quintiles, and 
what role labour and property incomes play in the generation of income. This model 
covers the basic elements of Piketty’s model in one framework and emphasises 
observation by Milanovic [7] that the functional income (primary income) distribution 
is not the same as the income distribution between households. First, the functional 
approach does not cover redistribution of income at all, and second, part of the 
primary income is received by other sectors than households. 
                                                 
3 For instance for the U.S. these accounts are reported in [6]. 
4 More debate on the assumptions of Piketty: [8] and [9]. 
5 The pure “income” concept according to national accounts without the inclusion of unrealised holding 
gains and losses is possible solution, but results have to monitored against this drawback, especially 
when comparing income on bonds and deposits vis-à-vis vis shares and mutual fund shares. 
 
This article is organised as follows: the next section discusses the framework applied 
in this article. Section 3 presents the results and finally, the work is concluded and 
potential extensions are discussed. 
 
2. Framework 
 
Table (1.) presents the overall framework applied in this article. [10] The first 
horizontal row includes input data. The framework starts with the financial balance 
sheets (A), which generate property income.6 In practice, this is wealth invested in 
financial instruments and land, which generates property/rental income. The national 
accounts capital stock covers the fixed capital that is used for actual production. In 
this context, it should be noted that letting of flats is considered production in national 
accounts. 
 
Table 1: The framework illustrating how from the balance sheet of the whole economy data are 
stepwise-linked with the income flows and the income distribution data is used in deriving 
distributional national income 
 
 
After this, the balance sheets are linked at the instrument level with the corresponding 
property income flows (B). These data are available in the non-financial accounts of 
national accounts.7 The second horizontal row presents the derived results, which are 
based on the calculation performed in this framework. Concerning the balance sheets 
and the corresponding property income, this means the instrument-specific rates of 
returns. 
 
After this, national income is completed by adding the missing income flows to the 
property income. In practice, this means compensation of employees and subsidies on 
production (C). The flows belonging to the households sector are separated from the 
flows of the total economy (D). Finally, these flows are linked with the corresponding 
flows of the income distribution statistics (E). 
 
The income flows of the Finnish income distribution statistics exhibit under-coverage 
compared to the national accounts’ flows. The under-coverage is corrected by 
distributing it equally between the households, i.e. the income distribution statistics 
aggregates are “lifted” on the levels of national accounts’ income flows.8 As the 
                                                 
6 When comparing data, it should be mentioned that in the financial accounts business wealth is part of 
financial wealth, while in distributional accounts for financial wealth (HFCS) main parts of the 
business wealth is attributed to non-financial wealth other than dwellings and land. To illustrate the 
importance: Half of the property income of households in the EU-19, 65% in Finland is attributed to 
distributed income on corporations. 
7 The rates of returns are based on the assumption that these measures are consistent. The stocks and 
the related income flows are calculated separately, and thus an error/inconsistency might appear in the 
rates of returns. This would appear as overly low or high rates of returns as well as discrepancies 
between net lending/borrowing calculated based on financial and non-financial accounts. 
8 In theory, the household population between the national accounts and income distribution statistics 
should be the same, except concerning the coverage of institutionalised households. These are covered 
A. Financial balance 
sheets
B. Property income 
flows
C. Corresponding 
national income flows
D. The income flows 
related to households
E. Corresponding 
flows in the income 
distribution statistics
Implicit rates of 
returns
Households' share of 
the income flows
National income 
broken down by 
income deciles
income distribution statistics are based on the tax data, the gap between these two sets 
of statistics is relatively small. Table (2.) presents a summary of the income 
distribution statistics share of the national accounts. As can be seen in the table, the 
coverage rates are excellent. The estimation error due to fact that the estimation is 
performed at the macro level instead of correcting the micro-level data is relatively 
small. The coverage ratios in interest and entrepreneurial income are the lowest, but 
even these coverage rates clearly exceed 60 per cent. 
 
Table 2: The share (%) of individual income distribution statistics transactions of the corresponding 
national accounts’ flows in years 1995-2016 as well as the share the conceptual differences and non-
comparable transactions of the primary income, summary statistics 
 
Source: Author’s calculations and Statistics Finland 
 
The relation between the coverage ratios and the estimation error caused by the use of 
macro sources is the following: if the instrument-level coverage ratios are low, the 
“lifting” of the transaction levels may change “the income order” of households, i.e. 
as a result of “the lifting” some households may become relatively richer and some 
households relatively poorer than they used to be in the original observations. This 
may have an impact on the income distribution both within household deciles and 
between household deciles. From the methodological point of view, the correct way 
of implementing this correction would be implementing it directly at the level of 
individual household data, and thus the micro data would be “lifted” at the level of 
the macro data. This is, however, far more resource-intensive exercise, particularly for 
the complete time series, and therefore we consider that the method applied provides 
sufficiently reliable results due to overall high coverage ratios. 
 
All income flows covered in the income distribution statistics and national accounts 
are covered. Regarding the coverage, these two statistics should be quite similar as the 
income flows are mainly based on income tax data. The main issue related to the 
income tax data is that it does not cover all the income generated from wealth abroad. 
Gabriel Zucman [12], who has also worked with Thomas Piketty, has estimated that 
roughly eight per cent of the financial wealth in the world is invested in tax havens. 
This estimate is based on rough assumptions, but it is the best available. The Finnish 
Tax Administration estimates that the Finnish tax data in 2017 excluded roughly EUR 
8 billion. This is estimate is based on the international tax data exchange.[13] As the 
Finnish household financial net wealth is roughly EUR 140 billion, it would mean that 
slightly less than six per cent of the wealth was missing. Investing abroad usually 
                                                                                                                                            
in the national accounts and excluded from the income distribution statistics. Institutionalised 
households refer to households which are in institutions like hospitals and prisons for a long period of 
time or permanently. More on the coverage of income distribution statistics and national accounts: 
[11].  
entrepreneuria
l income interest dividends imputed rents
wages and 
salaries
the share of 
conceptual 
differences
non‐
comparable 
transactions
minimum 63.3 34.9 87.2 89.8 96.4 17.7 1.9
1. quartile 65.0 50.9 93.6 92.8 97.4 18.1 2.3
median (2. quartile) 65.9 62.9 96.1 94.1 97.6 19.2 2.4
3. quartile 67.2 72.7 98.0 98.1 97.8 19.9 2.6
maximum (4. quartile) 72.7 105.0 161.5 102.4 99.1 22.0 2.9
interquartile range 2.2 21.8 4.4 5.3 0.4 1.8 0.3
standard deviation 2.4 18.2 14.8 3.4 0.6 1.2 0.3
average 66.5 64.6 98.2 95.3 97.7 19.3 2.4
requires tax planning, and thus it is clear that this missing wealth belongs mainly to 
rich households or their holding companies. 
 
In the following section, the framework will be explained in detail. The letters/steps 
presented in the tables refer to the letters/steps in Table (1.). Table (3.) presents steps 
A and B, which shows how the national balance sheets are linked with the 
corresponding property income flows. On the left-hand side of the table, the balance 
sheets and its asset types are presented and on the right-hand side, the corresponding 
income flows. 
 
Table 3: National balance sheets and the related income flows 
 
 
In step B the income flows in the table, which are missing from the national income 
concept, are added in table (4.). These flows are in practice operating surplus, i.e. 
profits before the distribution of profits and taxes9, compensation of employees and 
taxes and subsidies on production. On the right hand-side, entrepreneurial income, 
which is operating surplus plus net property income related to entrepreneurial 
activities, is separated from the rest of the income flows10. It is important to note that 
imputed rents are based on a similar calculation to entrepreneurial income, i.e. by 
definition imputed rents are entrepreneurial income generated by owner-occupied 
housing11.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 This corresponds in the bookkeeping with the concept of EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes).  
10 This corresponds in the bookkeeping with the concept of EBT (earnings before taxes). 
11 In practice this is operating surplus generated by owner-occupied housing and from which 
corresponding (mortgage) interest flows are deducted. 
A: Financial balance sheets: B: Property income flows (corresponding):
Deposits (F.2)
Debt seucrities (F.3)
Loans (F.4)
Other accounts payable/receiveable (F.8)
Listed shares (F.511)
Unlisted shares (F.512)
Other equity (F.519)
Non‐life insurance technical reserves (F.61)
Life insurance and annuity entitlements (F.62)
Pension entitlements (F.63)
Claims of pension fund on pension managers (F64)
Financial derivates and ESOs (F.7)
Reinvested earning on foreign direct investment (D.43)
Interest payable/receivable (D.41)
Dividends (D.421)
Withdrawals from income of quasi‐corporations (D.422)
Investment fund shares/units (F.52) Investment income attributable to collective investment fund shareholders (D
Investment income attributable to insurance policy holders (D.441)
Investment income payable on pension entitlements (D.442)
Natural resources (N.21) Rent (D.45)
By nature do not accumulate any income
Table 4: National income flows  
 
 
Table (5.) shows how the transactions of household sector are linked with the 
corresponding income distribution statistics income flows. This corresponds in Table 
(1.) to steps D and E. The grey areas in the table emphasise the differences between 
national accounts and income distribution statistics. As can be seen in Table (2.), the 
share of non-comparable transactions varies between 17 and 22 per cent of the 
primary income. However, this does not mean that the income distribution statistics 
do not include any corresponding transactions with the national accounts. For 
instance, employers’ social contributions are broken down by income deciles of 
wages and salaries, as these two are clearly connected. The last column in Table (2.) 
shows the share of the non-comparable items of national income. These types of 
transactions represent roughly two per cent of the national income. These transactions 
are: paid interest, reinvested earnings on direct foreign investment, investment income 
from collective mutual funds belonging to shareholders, investment income based on 
pension entitlements and investment income attributable to policyholders in 
insurance. In theory, investment income based on pension entitlements and 
investment income attributable to policyholders in insurance could be broken down 
into the income deciles by using the corresponding stock in the wealth survey but this 
is not done as the time series of the wealth survey are too short and these data are not 
annually available. As these transactions are also small, the error caused is minor.12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 This might vary from country to country, e.g. taking into account examples like the Netherlands with 
high proportion of pension capital and consequently high proportion of related income. 
C: Gross National Income (primary income):
1. Property and entrepreunerial income (income flow) 2. Entrepreneurial income
Operating surplus, gross (B.2G) / mixed income (B.3G) Operating surplus, gross (B.2G) / mixed income (B.3G)
minus Interest, payable (D.411) of which minus Interest, payable (D.411)
plus  Interest, receivable (D.411) of which plus  Interest, receivable (D.411)
minus FISIM correction, payable (D.412) minus FISIM correction, payable (D.412)
plus  FISIM correction, receivable (D.412) plus  FISIM correction, receivable (D.412)
minus Dividends, payable (D.421) of which plus 
plus Dividends, receivable (D.421)
Withdrawals from income of quasi‐corporations (D.422) = net zero of which plus Withdrawals from income of quasi‐corporations, receivable (D.422)
minus Investment income attributable to collective investment, payable (D.443) of which plus Investment income attributable to collective investment, payable (D.443)
plus Investment income attributable to collective investment, receivable (D.443) minus Investment income attributable to collective investment, receivable (D.443)
minus Reinvested earning on foreign direct investment, payable (D.43) of which plus
plus Reinvested earning on foreign direct investment, receivable (D.43)
minus Investment income attributable to insurance policy holders, payable (D.441) of which minus Investment income attributable to insurance policy holders, payable (D.441)
plus Investment income attributable to insurance policy holders, receivable (D.441) plus Investment income attributable to insurance policy holders, receivable (D.441)
minus Investment income payable on pension entitlements, payable (D.442) of which minus Investment income payable on pension enetitlements, payable (D.442)
plus Investment income payable on pension entitlements, receivable (D.442) plus Investment income payable on pension enetitlements, receivable (D.442)
minus Rent, payable (D.45) of which minus Rent, payable (D.45)
plus Rent, receivable (D.45) plus Rent, receivable (D.45)
plus Compensation of employees, receivable (D.1)
     Wages and salaries (D.11)
     Employers' social contributions  (D.12)
plus Taxes on products (D.2)
minus Subsidies (D.3)
Dividends, receivable (D.421)
Reinvested earning on foreign direct investment, receivable (D.43)
Table 5: The household share of the national income (total primary income) and the corresponding 
flows of the income distribution statistics 
 
The transactions on the left-hand side (D) are from the national accounts and on the right-hand side (E) 
from the income distribution statistics. The transactions on same line indicates which transactions have 
been used in breaking down the national income transaction by income deciles. The grey areas in the 
table emphasise the differences between the national income and income distribution statistics. 
 
3. Results 
 
Graph (1.) shows that the households’ balance sheets as well as the total economy 
balance sheets have grown particularly quickly in the past twenty years.13 Both the 
balance sheets of households and total economy have doubled from 1995 to 2016 in 
relation to wages and salaries. In this analysis, financial stock and actual rate of 
returns have been “corrected” with the index of wages and salaries earnings. The 
reason is that this illustrates the development in relation to “a normal household” or “a 
working household”, i.e. how much quicker these have been developed than labour 
income. Without this correction, the growth would have been roughly double that 
shown in the graph.14 This correction does not have any impact on the change of rate 
of returns, which corresponds with Piketty’s r (return on capital) as well as the other 
estimations/results presented later in this article.15 It is interesting to notice that the 
household sector financial wealth grew more quickly than the financial wealth of the 
other sectors.  
 
 
                                                 
13 A main reason of the increase is the revaluation of financial wealth. 
14 Wages and salaries grew by 93 per cent from 1995 to 2016. 
15 It is important to notice that the rates of returns do not cover realised or non-realised holding gains. 
In the national income estimations these are classified as price changes rather than income. This same 
assumption applies to Piketty’s calculations. 
D: National income: of which: household sector E: Corresponding flows in income distribution statistics
minus Interest, payable (D.411)
plus  Interest, receivable (D.411)
minus FISIM correction, payable (D.412)
plus  FISIM correction, receivable (D.412)
plus
Withdrawals from income of quasi‐corporations (D.422) together with entrepreneurial income
plus Other property income
Reinvested earning on foreign direct investment, payable (D.43)
plus Reinvested earning on foreign direct investment, receivable (D.43) Other property income
plus Other property income
plus Other property income
minus Rent, payable (D.45)
plus Rent, receivable (D.45)
2. Entrepreunerial income (gross)
plus Entrepreneurial income from agriculture (B4G) Entrepreneurial income from agriculture
plus Entrepreneurial income from forestry (B4G) Entrepreneurial income from forestry
plus Other entrepreneurial income (B4G) (together with rents receivable (D.45)) Other entrepreneurial income
plus Imputed rents (B4G) Imputed rents 
3. Compensation of employees
plus Compensation of employees, receivable (D.1)
     Wages and salaries (D.11)
     Employers' social contributions  (D.12)
Rent on land in entrepreneurial income
Wages and salaries
Interest, receivable
Dividends, receivable (D.421) Received dividends
Investment income attributable to collective investment, receivable (D.443)
Investment income attributable to insurance policy holders, receivable (D.441)
Investment income payable on pension entitlements, receivable (D.442)
Graph 1: Financial stock and return of capital which are deflated by the index of wages and salaries as 
well rates of returns for the whole domestic economy and households, 1995=100 
 
Source: Statistics Finland and author’s calculations 
 
During the same time frame the household and total economy rates of return16 have 
roughly halved. During the years of strong economic growth, like around year 2000 
and before the subprime crisis (2008) the rates of returns increased but, as can be seen 
in the graph, the trend of returns is clearly declining. This development is logical, as 
at the beginning of the euro area the overall interest rates converged due to the single 
monetary policy and thus, in several countries – including Finland – declined 
compared to the past when the monetary union countries still had their own 
independent monetary policy. This process began at the end of 1996 when the Finnish 
markka was brought into the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European 
Monetary System (EMS) in which fluctuation within a band of 15 per cent was 
allowed. At the beginning of 1999, the fixed conversion rate between the Finnish 
markka and euro was confirmed. After the financial crisis, interest rates crashed as the 
European Central Bank dropped its interest rates benchmarks to zero and overnight 
deposit facility rates even to negative. 
 
However, it is important to note that the underlying reason for the decreasing rates of 
return was not only decreasing interest, but also because the returns on shares crashed. 
Returns on shares are typically more volatile than interest rates and they follow the 
overall economic development more closely than the interest instruments. However, 
the trend of returns, i.e. distributed income of corporations decreased during this 
period. At the beginning of the 1990s the Finnish economy was in a severe depression 
and the profitability of corporations was overall poor. Consequently, returns were also 
low. The depression was followed by rapid economic growth and thus, the profits of 
corporations increased rapidly. The dividends and rates of return increased and this is 
reflected in Graph (1.) as an increase of rates of return. At the beginning of the 21st 
century, dividends increased rapidly, which led to the one per cent growth of the total 
rate of returns. In 2008 the rates of return of the dividends were a record-breaking 
nine per cent of the underlying stock. By 2016, because of the economic downturn, 
                                                 
16 Defined as property income (as defined in the national accounts) divided by the underlying stock of 
financial assets.  
decreasing interest reference rates and the unconventional monetary policy, the rates 
of returns roughly halved to 4.5 per cent. Households’ dividend returns were lower 
than in the other sectors although the total rates of returns were similar.17 
 
Due to the decrease in the returns on dividends, the entire portfolio’s rates of returns 
have increased moderately. Households’ portfolio grew nine per cent more quickly 
than wages and salaries from 1995. The entire domestic economy’s portfolio 
increased only 4.5 per cent more quickly than wages and salaries. The rates of returns 
of other than interest-bearing instruments were low in 1995. Typically, the rates of 
returns are volatile and consequently, the actual property income is also very volatile. 
In 2008 the rates of return and the actual property income were above their trend but 
after this they fell below.  
 
Graph (2.) shows the household share of the primary income (national income), the 
compensation of employees as a share of national income, the compensation of 
employees as a share of household sector primary income (national income) for the 
household sector as well as broken down by income quintiles. It is important to note 
that the income deciles are calculated from disposable income and not from primary 
income even though the lines in the graph represent the compensation of employees’ 
shares of primary incomes broken down by income deciles. The reason is that 
disposable income shows the actual situation of households concerning their income 
and welfare and primary income does not take into account the effect of income 
redistribution.  
 
Graph 2: Primary income share of households, labour share (compensation of employees) of national 
income and the labour share of primary income 
 
 
Source: Statistics Finland and author’s calculations. 
 
In graph (2.) the household shares of primary income are presented as a histogram 
with black background. During economic downturns, the share is typically larger than 
                                                 
17 The assumption in calculating the rates of returns is that financial and non-financial accounts are 
consistent. The indication of consistency is that the net lending/borrowing based on non-financial 
accounts is consistent with the net lending/borrowing based on the financial accounts. In the Finnish 
national accounts this is not the case and thus, this discrepancy may cause a relatively small error in the 
calculations. 
during periods of economic growth. The reason is that households typically mainly 
receive compensation of employees while the other economic sectors receive only 
property income. Typically, property income is considerably more volatile and 
decreases during economic downturns. In 1995 the share of compensation of 
employees was 75 per cent of national income. Due to the economic depression, this 
was quite high. Then the share started to decrease, falling to 70 per cent in 2007. After 
this, it continuously increased again, exceeding 75 per cent in 2012/13 before 
beginning to decrease again.   
 
The primary income sources belonging to households are compensation of employees 
and property income, as primary income belonging to other sectors is purely property 
income. Therefore, Piketty’s assumption that the functional income distribution of the 
entire economy would be reflected directly in the income distribution between 
households is wrong. As other sectors than households receive property income and 
not compensation of employees, the increasing income of these sectors increases the 
property income share of functional income distribution. Thus, this type of increase of 
property income share of functional income distribution does not have any impact on 
the income distribution between households. 
 
The primary income received by the other sectors is property income that they receive 
from their ownership. In the case of corporations, these improve their net financing 
position, allowing them to either pay higher dividends or invest. In the case of the 
third or public sector, the money is used to finance the activities of the sector.  
 
Graph: 3. Compensation of employees’ shares of primary income by income deciles and the labour 
share of primary income in household sector 
 
Source: Statistics Finland and author’s calculations 
 
It is important to note that when the property income share is high (inverse of the grey 
bar), households’ primary income share is also low (black histograms in the graph). 
Thus, the changes in the income shares do not transfer fully to the income distribution 
between households. The relation depends on the amount of financial assets held by 
other sectors than households. If the assets held by the other sectors are small, then 
the link between functional income distribution and income distribution between 
households is direct. In Finland, the government sector for instance has considerably 
greater assets. The incomes generated by these assets are used to finance the 
government sector. 
 
In Graph (2.) the white histogram shows the households’ labour income share of the 
primary income. The share has been around 76-77 per cent and the variation has been 
relatively small. In 2015 and 2016, the shares have been slightly below 76 per cent. 
The lines in Graph (3.) show the compensation of employees’ shares of primary 
income by income deciles. The shares vary from year to year but the variation is 
relatively small.  
 
In Graph (3.) the trend lines of the first (lowest) and tenth (highest) income deciles are 
indicated with trend lines (the actual line: black “point” dashed line next to the trend 
line in the middle of the graph). The lower darker trend line is the trend line of the 
first decile and the upper one (in the middle of the graph) the trend line of the tenth 
decile. As can be seen in Graph (3.) the primary income of the first income decile is 
overall quite low because the primary income is typically generated from assets or 
wages and salaries. 
 
Graph (4.) shows the primary income share of disposable income. This is an 
indication of the wages’, salaries’ and property income’s relation to the transfers 
received. The first income decile typically receives its income from transfers and thus, 
received wages and salaries are relatively low. The highest income deciles typically 
receive much property income and thus, the share of property income in the top decile 
is normally the highest. It is interesting to note that the primary income share of 
disposable income has decreased in the past years in all deciles. In practice, this 
means that net transfers have increased practically in all the income deciles. The 
underlying reason for this is demographic, i.e. as the average age increases, the 
households are increasingly earning pensions (transfers) instead of labour income. 
Partially, the impact may be explained by the relatively decreasing income and wealth 
taxes and increasing or less decreasing social benefits. 
 
Graph 4: The primary income share of disposable income by income decile, 1995–2016 
 
Source: Statistics Finland and author’s calculations 
The labour shares of primary income in different income deciles have remained 
almost stable (Graph 3). The variation of the shares in different income deciles is 
roughly a few per cent. Typically, high-income decile families are more sensitive to 
changes in property income but there is clearly no structural changes in the Finnish 
data. The labour income shares are the highest in the seventh (dashed blue line on the 
top of the graph), eighth (dashed line on the top (the third from the top) of the graph), 
and ninth (grey “dashed line on the top (the second from the top) of the graph) 
deciles. It is important to note that imputed rents are property income. The imputed 
rental income is typically more important for middle-income than for high-income 
families. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
This article presents a framework, which starts from the balance sheets of the 
economy, links those with the corresponding income flows of national income, and 
separates the income flows that belong to the households. Finally, these flows are 
linked with the income distribution data, which allows scrutiny of capital and labour 
income by income quintiles. 
 
This relative short analysis focuses on the years from 1995 to 2016, indicating that 
Piketty’s scenario, where we would enter a new belle époque, would not be realised in 
Finland. Financial wealth has roughly doubled in relation to wages and salaries in past 
twenty years. However, this has not had any impact on property income and the 
labour shares of different quintiles have remained almost unchanged. The main reason 
for this is that rates of return have collapsed.  
  
If the rates of return remained at the same level as in the 1990s, income generation as 
well as distribution would have changed considerably. However, the rates of return 
halved, which also cancelled out the potential effect of the increase of the balance 
sheets. The returns varied according to the economic cycle, but the trend of returns 
was decreasing. At the beginning of the euro area the driving force was the decreasing 
interest rates, which fell overall, but the impact was particularly strong in border 
states like Finland. In 2008 the redistributed profits of corporations were at a record 
high but this was not enough to turn the overall trend of decrease. From 2008 onwards 
the distributed profits also fell and interest continued decreasing as well. 
 
The approach of this article differs from Piketty’s even though it discusses the same 
phenomenon. As Milanovic [7] has emphasised, national income is not the same as 
disposable income and the link between these two is not direct. This article 
specifically analyses how the changes in the distribution of national income affect 
income distribution between households. The labour or capital – however one wants 
to approach it – share typically varies in time and during strong economic growth 
profits also increase quickly, which leads to an increasing capital share in national 
income. However, it is important to note that the households’ share of primary income 
decreases at the same time as well. The other sectors than households receive only 
property income and, when property income grows more quickly than labour income, 
the household share of primary income decreases. In Finland, the public sector holds a 
considerable amount of assets. If we think this as a purely statistical process, the 
primary income share of other sectors than households functions as a filter between 
the household and total economy functional income distribution. This means that the 
functional income distribution overestimates the property income received by 
households. In the Finnish case specifically, pensions18 are partly funded and the 
property income generated by these pension stocks also benefit households even 
though they increase the capital share in the functional income distribution. 
 
Piketty’s analysis is based on a strongly simplified world. The assumption is that 
increasing capital leads inescapably to increasing property income, which increases 
the inequality of income distribution. Piketty [14] also admits these simplifications in 
an article published in the book After Piketty. In his analysis, it does not really matter 
who owns the capital and thus, it does not take into account the importance of other 
economic sectors. It also does not take into account the importance of redistribution in 
income generation. Piketty’s analysis is supported by another French economist, 
Zucman [12], who analyses how rich households hide their property in tax havens. 
 
The fact that these approaches are not necessarily completely correct does not change 
the possibility that increasing wealth will have an impact on income generation at 
some point. For instance, in societies where the public sector does not own assets or 
the role of the public sector in welfare policies is limited, functional income 
distribution is directly reflected in the income distribution between households. This 
means that in such societies Piketty’s model also works better than in countries like 
Finland. Therefore, it is essential to discuss different impacts on different societies 
and how different societal models affect income distribution. It should also be noted 
that this analysis covers only the past twenty years and it is not possible to extend it to 
cover centuries as Piketty did in his analysis. The data used is available in such detail 
only for a limited number of countries and over a limited time span. From this point 
of view, the compromises made by Piketty are understandable.  
 
This article analysed how functional distributions in different income deciles have 
developed. Typically, in income deciles, which have relatively more property income, 
the capital/labour income share changes according to economic cycles. It is also 
important to note that the property income for several middle-income families is 
actually imputed rents, i.e. income flows which are imputed to them because they own 
the property in which they live. In the last few years the share of labour income has 
decreased in almost all the income deciles. 
 
In the future it would be interesting to extend this approach to some other countries – 
particularly, to countries in which the public sector does not play a strong role. There 
is no reason to think that the prices and the rates of return would not develop in a 
similar manner. The money and capital markets are liberalised, and particularly within 
the European Union, the differences in portfolio returns should mainly be affected by 
the portfolio structure and to a certain extent the differences in the financial situation 
in different corporations. The major differences are between the countries, i.e. how 
much different sectors own different assets and, in particular, how rich are the third 
and public sectors. The larger the households’ share of assets, the more direct the 
relation between functional income distribution and distribution between households. 
Additionally, the type of redistribution policy run by the government greatly defines 
the final distribution of income between households. This aspect has not been covered 
here. 
                                                 
18 Classified as social security pensions in national accounts. 
 
Data availability makes it difficult to replicate this exercise in other countries. The 
financial balance sheets, related flows, national income (including its components) 
and household sector (covering its flows) are relatively easily available in the 
European countries. It is difficult to find data that separate entrepreneurial income 
from the rest of the property income flows and, in particular, sufficiently detailed 
income distribution data. Additionally, most income distribution studies are actually 
surveys and not based on the register data, and therefore the coverage ratios are 
considerably lower than in Finland. This means that if this analysis is applied to other 
countries, certain compromises concerning the quality of the results most likely need 
to be accepted. 
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